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William Paul Bell 
Craig Froome 
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School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia 
 
Abstract 
This paper aims to identify climate change adaptation issues in the Australian National 
Electricity Market by assessing the robustness of the institutional arrangements that support 
effective adaptation.  The paper finds that three major factors are hindering or are required 
for adaptation to climate change: institutional fragmentation both economically and politically; 
distorted transmission and distribution investment deferment mechanisms; and lacking 
mechanisms to develop a diversified energy portfolio.  Proposed solutions to the three 
factors are discussed.  These proposed solutions are tested and examined in forthcoming 
reports. 
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1 Introduction 
The objectives of this review are to examine the adaptive capacity of existing institutional 
arrangements in the Australian National Electricity Market (NEM) to existing and predicted 
climate change conditions.  Specifically the paper aims to:  
• identify climate change adaptation issues in the NEM; and 
• assess the robustness of the institutional arrangements that support effective 
adaptation. 
The main motivation stems from the development of existing institutional arrangements 
under the premise of stable climate conditions.  Environmental issues, such as drought and 
increased climate variability have been largely overlooked and the recent past has 
demonstrated that this premise is no longer appropriate.  The Government’s policy response 
has been varied and somewhat uncoordinated, which has the potential to compromise the 
reliability of the NEM.  In support of this observation, Ford et al. [1] make a systematic review 
of the observed climate change adaption in developed countries using a meta search of the 
literature and find comparatively limited reporting from Australia.  There is a need to redress 
this situation with the final conclusion from this review highlighting possible ways forward. 
This review assumes a need to adapt to climate change based on the arguments in Garnaut 
[2] and Yates and Mendis [3] that accurate prediction of climate change is fraught with 
uncertainty but there is scientific consensus that climate change is highly probable and the 
cost of not proactively adapting to climate change is high. 
Institutional arrangements in the context of this review refer to structure, ownership and 
regulations where structure includes market operations, market design, spot pool and market 
trading.  Ownership includes public versus private and regulations include pricing. 
2 Literature Review  
An extensive literature review has been undertaken in order to identify those areas where 
key research overlaps.  Some studies have been performed to understand the risks 
associated with climate change, for instance Yates and Mendis [3], however, the literature 
relating to Australia’s electricity supply interests are significantly under-developed.  
Specifically, this review will consider three key points: 
a) the potential impacts of more variable climate conditions on the electricity industry; 
b) the effectiveness of adaptation actions being carried out in the NEM and the potential 
for maladaptation [4]; and 
c) the flow-on effects of climate change impacts and maladaptation [4] actions in other 
linked infrastructure industries. 
Yates and Mendis [3] note that climate change affects multiple units and functions of the 
electricity infrastructure, so a systematic approach is required to identify vulnerabilities and 
maladaption in the infrastructure to formulate a climate change adaption strategic plan.  
Furthermore, they recommend that any plan must be embedded into the various units and 
functions rather than overlayed. 
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The review finds that three factors are hindering or are required for adaption to climate 
change:  
1. fragmentation of the NEM both politically and economically; 
2. accelerated deterioration of the transmission and distribution infrastructure due to 
climate change requiring the deployment of technology to defer investment in 
transmission and distribution; and 
3. portfolio of generation technology and energy sources to reduce supply risk. 
These factors are interrelated, for instance, the fragmentation of the NEM has hindered the 
deployment of technologies to allow deferment of investment in transmission and distribution.  
The investment in transmission and distribution is primarily driven by peak demand, which 
could be mitigated with smart meters, flexible retail tariffs and consumer engagement.  On 
the supply side, the mandatory Renewable Energy Targets (RET) scheme has primarily 
driven onshore wind and solar PV uptake to the detriment of a broader portfolio.  The 
onshore wind and solar PV each have their intermittent supply cycles that present a 
challenge to matching supply and demand.  A broader portfolio of generation technology, 
storage and energy sources could both mitigate the intermittent supply cycles and aid 
deferment in transmission and distribution investment.  However, promoting a broader 
portfolio of renewable energy would require modifications to the existing policy to incorporate 
targets for specific technologies and energy resources. 
The fragmentation of the NEM has been acknowledged through the formation of a number of 
bodies to address coordination issues including, the Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE), 
Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC), Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) 
and the Australian Energy Regulator (AER).  However the underlying fragmentation and 
induced coordination problem still remains.  Politically the NEM covers six states or 
territories and their legislative requirements.  Economically the NEM has ten distribution 
companies and seven transmission companies.  In contrast, South Korea, with two and half 
times the population of Australia, has a single company running both transmission and 
distribution within a single legislative entity.  But it must be acknowledged that South Korea 
covers an area smaller than the NEM region.  However, a single company, Telstra, manages 
the entire copper based telecommunications network for the whole of Australia, which covers 
a much larger area than the NEM.  Hence the NEM’s region covering a larger area than 
South Korea is a poor justification for fragmentation.  South Korea’s adaption to climate 
change is more advanced than the NEM because South Korea lacks the political and 
economic coordination overhead of the NEM.  The forthcoming report Foster et al. [5] will 
include an international comparison to test this fragmentation observation. 
The linking of the once separate state transmission and distribution networks to form the 
NEM’s network has transformed the once natural monopoly within each state into a single 
NEM wide natural monopoly.  So, the legacy fragmentation of the NEM’s network causes 
coordination problems, which are a source of maladaption to climate change.  In contrast, 
retail and generation are more amenable to numerous companies competing, so the 
fragmentation brings these markets closer to perfect competition to derive benefits for 
consumers.  However the state ownership of transmission, distribution, generation and retail 
provides a conflict of interest for companies installing new generation to attach to the state 
owned networks to compete with the state owned generators.   This conflict of interest is an 
impediment to the development of a broad portfolio of generation technology and energy 
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sources.  Both the NEM’s transmission and distribution network fragmentation and the 
conflict of interest cause maladaption to climate change.  
This review discusses sources of maladaption to provide a measure of adaption to climate 
change and to suggest alternative more flexible arrangements to climate change to three key 
issues: 
1. institutional fragmentation both economically and politically; 
2. distorted transmission and distribution investment deferment mechanisms; and 
3. lacking mechanisms to develop a diversified energy portfolio. 
Foster et al. [6] discuss how the transmission and distribution infrastructure will be subjected 
to accelerated ageing and subject to more faults from higher winds and temperatures.  As 
discussed the higher frequency of faults can be ameliorated by better design and improved 
maintenance but [6]both act to increase the cost of installing new lines and running exiting 
lines.  This sensitivity of transmission and distribution to climate change makes the 
deferment of transmission investment more important.  This section particularly scrutinises 
institutional arrangements to highlight potential sources of maladaption to defer investment 
in transmission. 
Stevens [7] discusses if the energy sector infrastructure is to adapt to climate change, a 
totally integrated holistic approach to the provision and management is required.  He notes 
that this approach is particularly relevant to the electricity sector and identifies two 
impediments to achieving suitable outcomes being the intensely competitive environment 
and the diverse ownership of infrastructure.  So, this section compares the adaptation to 
climate change of the South Korean and Australian electricity systems to provide a gauge to 
Australia’s success.  The contrast highlights the success of the simple institutional structure 
of South Korea’s national government and electricity monopoly over the complex institutional 
structure of Australia’s state governments and diverse ownership of infrastructure.  The 
forthcoming report Foster et al. [5] will expand upon the comparison between these two 
markets. 
Foster et al. [6] also discuss the need to develop a portfolio of energy to reduce supply risk 
where the RET provides onshore wind and solar PV with a first mover advantage at the 
expense of a broader portfolio of energy.  This first mover advantage for solar PV is 
exacerbated by the solar bonus built into a feed-in tariff.   
This section discusses the three key issues in the following subsections. 
2.1 Feed-in tariffs incorporating a renewable energy bonus 
This section discusses feed-in tariffs incorporating a renewable energy bonus where the 
bonus acts a as a source of maladaption but an economically neutral and sustainable feed-in 
tariff is essential to the development of a smart grid and adaption to climate change for the 
NEM. 
The International Energy Association (IEA) [8] observes that nearly all countries now offer or 
are planning feed-in tariffs for solar PV but debate has shifted from ‘if or how to implement a 
feed-in tariff’ to ‘how to move to a self-sustaining market post feed-in tariff’.  This section 
discusses feed-in tariffs as a source of four market failures: 
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• inappropriate infant industry assistance; 
• exacerbating inequity; 
• inadequate transmission investment deferment price signal; and 
• poorly targeting myopic investment behaviour. 
Additionally, this section discusses a sustainable feed-in tariff regime that addresses the four 
market failures together with an international comparison of feed-in tariffs. 
IEA [8] acknowledges internationally feed-in tariffs have been poorly designed or poorly 
controlled resulting in explosive markets, profiteering, political interference, over-reliance on 
imports, market collapses, business closures and so on.  However there is now a wealth of 
information available worldwide to policymakers regarding the impact of various designs of 
feed-in tariff schemes and how and when to adjust tariffs to avoid overheated markets.  Gipe 
[9] provides an extensive and current discussion of feed-in tariffs.   
Under the guise of an infant industry argument, the states in Australia implemented feed-in 
tariffs to establish the domestic PV industry.  This policy has been overly successful but has 
produced maladaption by creating inconsistent gross or net feed-in tariffs calculation across 
Australia resulting in inconsistent remuneration, by causing cross subsidy of electricity 
resulting in inequity to favour the rich over the poor, by testing policy credibility, by creating 
poorly targeted infant industry assistance and by failing to target transmission investment 
deferment. 
The problem with infant industry assistance is that the assistance is only intended for a 
limited term but carries the innate problems of when to withdraw assistance and of retaining 
policy credibility when withdrawing assistance.  For instance the Australian Capital Territory 
(ACT) Minister for the Environment and Sustainable Development [10] closed new 
applications for micro feed-in tariffs but successfully ensures policy credibility by honouring 
existing feed-in tariff agreements.  However, Garnaut [11] discusses how those consumers 
receiving feed-in tariffs are being cross-subsidised by other consumers, which is 
economically inefficient.  In agreement, Nelson, Simshauser and Kelly [12] estimate the 
household impact of feed-in tariffs by income groupings and conclude that wealthier 
households are beneficiaries and the effective taxation rate for low income households is 
three times higher than that paid by the wealthiest households.  So, there is a policy 
dilemma that is maintaining policy credibility perpetuates economic inefficiency and social 
inequity.  
A resolution to this policy dilemma would be to maintain feed-in tariffs fixed permanently in 
nominal terms to those consumers contracted, so the influence of the agreed feed-in tariffs 
gradually fades out with time and are replaced by a more sustainable feed-in tariff regime. 
In addition, developing a more sustainable economically neutral feed-in tariff provides a way 
to internalise the positive externality of deferred transmission and distribution investment for 
investors in embedded generation [2].  However, there is debate over whether a feed-in tariff 
should be paid for the net or the gross contribution to the distribution grid.  Farrell [13] 
discusses the major drawback of net metering, which is to optimize the size of a solar array 
for on-site load rather than maximise the solar array.  The economic argument favours gross; 
this way the investor can make the decision to install the generators based on the 
contribution to the grid, so the feed-in tariff rate is based on the locational marginal price 
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(LMP) to provide the right price signal for generation investment.  AEMC [14] proposes LMP 
as one of five options in the transmission framework review.  Under the gross payment 
method the householder would pay the retail rate for the total electricity consumed whether 
sourced from the grid or from their own generator to provide an incentive for the customer to 
conserve electricity and to provide a profit motive for the retailer.  The charge for 
transmission and distributions costs need itemising on bills, as the customer does not use 
transmission or distributions to consume their own generated supply of electricity and to 
provide a price signal for the deferment in investment in transmission and distribution. 
The New South Wales (NSW) Auditor General [15] reviews the solar bonus scheme 
associated with the current gross feed-in tariff but discusses how prior to 2010 NSW had a 
net feed-in tariff.  Additionally, the Auditor General recommends a review of the projected 
cost of the solar bonus scheme to answer the question of sustainability and recommends 
provision be made for an exit strategy.  These changes or recommendations indicate that 
adaption is occurring in the right direction with the caveat that the solar bonus scheme is 
replaced with a sustainable gross feed-in tariff. 
The Australian PV Association (APVA) [16] and Watt [17] discuss how solar PV has reached 
grid parity, that is electricity generated at the same price as coal plus transmission and 
distribution costs, but parity will be insufficient to ensure the appropriate economic level of 
household PV uptake because people suffer investment myopia over the returns from the 
30-40 year life of a PV unit.  In agreement, Yates and Mendis [3] and Williams [18] discuss 
the sensitive of demand for solar PV installation to interest rates and to financing.  A well 
researched market failure of the retirement industry is investment myopia that has spurred 
government intervention in the form of superannuation using a complex array of policies 
including tax breaks for voluntary contributions and compulsory contributions.  Similarly, the 
government intervenes to remedy a market failure in the provision of tertiary education to 
offer interest free student loans that provide equity and acknowledge the positive 
externalities of education.  The solar PV industry also exhibits investment myopia, positive 
externalities and equity concerns. 
Origin Energy [19] argues for interest free loans for efficient energy investment to address 
positive externalities and equity concerns.  A similar argument can be made for interest free 
loans for solar PV.  Addressing the equity and investment myopia aspects, tax breaks tend 
to favour the richer households over the poor, while interest free loans with repayments 
based on the ability to pay similar to the student load scheme is a much more equitable way 
to address investment myopia.  Additionally, a loan is more appropriate form of assistance, 
as there is an incentive for the prospective buyer to consider the solar PV installation as an 
investment requiring a cost benefit analysis rather than to simply obtain a tax break.  
Additionally, these long term investments are appropriate candidates for the revenue 
generated from the carbon pollution reduction scheme (CPRS).  Furthermore, identifying 
transmission and distribution lines nearing their maximum capacity would provide a 
mechanism to prioritise the loans at transmission and distribution investment deferment. 
Foster et al. [20] discusses how solar PV has acknowledged potential to defer transmission 
investments, which are largely driven by peak demand.  However, residential solar PV is 
insufficient and there is a requirement for significant commercial solar PV installation but 
unlike countries such as Germany and Spain, Australia has until recently very few incentives 
for commercial installations.  Williams [18] discuss the commoditisation of residential solar 
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PV, which is evidence that the residential segment of the solar PV market has moved 
beyond infant industry status and beyond infant industry support requirements.  Whereas the 
large and medium-scale solar PV segments are still in their infancy and still warrant direct 
infant industry support because the installation of medium and of large-scale solar PV 
requires a much higher degree of skill than residential solar PV.  
In infant industry assistance, Corbell [21] announces the first feed-in tariff in Australia for 
large scale solar.  The plan uses a feed-in tariff reverse auction for the two large scale solar 
generation plants capable of powering 7000 homes.  The reverse auction appears a much 
more appropriate method to target an infant industry than the oversubscribed fixed micro 
feed-in tariff.  The advantage of the reverse auction is that each time the auction is held the 
technology matures and the feed-in tariff becomes smaller, which provides an inexpensive 
way to maintain policy integrity and support infant industries.  Additionally, the two issues of 
over subscription and of overly supporting an infant industry become redundant.  This large 
scale feed-in tariff policy is a well adapted approached to climate change compared to the 
micro feed-in tariffs policies.   
IEA [8] and Renewable Energy Policy Network of the 21st Century [22] provide a comparison 
of countries’ feed-in tariffs.  REN21 [22] notes that Australia, Canada and the US have only 
state or province feed-in tariff policies, which contrasts with all the other countries that have 
national feed-in tariff policies.  Australia’s fragmentation of policy by state induces 
inconsistency among feed-in tariffs providing a source of maladaption.  The Australian 
Minister for Climate Change [23] discusses how a COAG Working Group is considering 
harmonising state feed-in tariffs for solar and other renewable energy technologies where 
there is a proposal for the preparation of an options paper on a nationally consistent 
approach to feed-in tariffs.  However a national policy has yet to appear. 
REN21 [22] compares when various countries and states have adopted a feed-in tariff.  The 
following list compares the adoption dates for the states in the NEM with South Korea.  
• 2003 South Korea 
• 2007 SA 
• 2008 Qld 
• 2009 ACT, NSW and VIC 
This comparison shows that the NEM is institutionally slow at adapting to climate change 
measures compared to South Korea.  The forthcoming report Foster et al. [5] will use 
REN21’s [22] international comparison of feed-in tariff adoption year as a climate change 
adoption performance indicator. 
Furthermore, the NSW Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal [24] is calling for 
submissions on establishing a fair and reasonable feed-in tariffs for electricity generated by 
small-scale solar PV.  In comparison, IEA [8] discusses how South Korea is one of the first 
countries to supersede the feed-in tariff where the RPA (Renewable Portfolio Agreement) 
will replace the feed-in tariff scheme in 2012.  Under the RPA, the government in conjunction 
with private enterprise plan to install 1.2 GW capacity of solar PV by the end of 2016.  Again 
another indicator that Australia is institutionally slow at adapting to climate change. 
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2.2 Carbon pollution reduction scheme 
The price signal from the carbon pollution reduction scheme (CPRS) is intended to transform 
the current portfolio of high CO2 emissions generators in Australia in favour of a lower 
emissions portfolio.  The CPRS starts with a carbon tax in July 2012, which converts to an 
emissions trading scheme (ETS) in July 2015.  The CPRS has the following four sources of 
maladaption to climate change.  
• CPRS supplanting RET 
• ETS market failure 
• Trading carbon credits internationally 
• International corruption  
Regarding CPRS supplanting RET, Garnaut [2] states “There are structural reasons to 
expect market failure in response to carbon pricing in relation to the information required for 
optimal use of known technologies; to research, development and commercialisation of new 
technologies; and to network infrastructure.”  Garnaut [2] suggests using policies to directly 
address the stated failures that will also negate the need for the RET.  However, under 
CPRS without RET gas generators can simply replace coal generators.  This coal to gas 
transformation would fail to improve Australia’s portfolio of energy sources.  In addition 
CPRS with RET better addresses domestic corruption and political lobbying.  Section 2.4 
further discusses the RET.  Section 2.6 discusses Garnaut’s [2] suggested policies regarding 
network infrastructure. 
Regarding ETS market failure, Ellerman and Joskow [25] discuss three market failures in the 
European Union (EU) ETS, being over allocation, price volatility and windfall profits for 
generators.  Ellerman and Joskow [25] consider these learning experiences, which can be 
overcome by using more accurate information, by allowing the banking of credits between 
compliance periods and by increasing the frequency of auctioning.  However, Lewis [26] 
reports on the latest EU ETS collapse in carbon prices, which is considered to result from a 
combination of over allocation and financial problems in Europe.  The EU ETS provides 
Australia with many valuable lessons and shows that developing a robust ETS comes with 
many unforseen problems, so it seems prudent to maintain the RET.  
Regarding trading carbon credits internationally, Garnaut [2] discusses how trading provides 
a mechanism to lower the overall costs to the world of the transformation to lower CO2 
emissions.  However, this trading proposal has three major problems being, international 
corruption, losing government revenue, and losing a policy tool to promote renewable energy 
sources domestically. 
In relation to international corruption, Transparency International [27] produces an 
international corruption perception index on 182 countries.  Table 1 shows the 16 least 
corrupt countries where Australia is ranked 8th.  The index compiles the results form a 
number of surveys to allow basic statistical analysis.  Since most of the world ranks as more 
corrupt than Australia, this does raise credibility issues over an international trade in carbon 
credits.  For instance in the least corrupt country New Zealand (NZ), Stock [28] reports on 
the NZ ETS experience in trading carbon credits internationally where the price for a NZ Unit 
(NZU) went from $22 in May 2011 to $11 in late November 2011.  This halving in the price of 
a NZU was the result of NZ emitters’ ability to import carbon credits.  However Stock [28] 
claims that some of the UN-backed Certified Emissions Reductions (CER) are of suspect 
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validity and predicts that the New Zealand Government will substantially curtail the import of 
CER. 
Table 1 International Corruption Perception Index for 2011 
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Max Min Lower bound 
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1 New Zealand 9.5 1 9 0.05 9.7 9.1 9.4 9.5 
2 Denmark 9.4 2 8 0.05 9.5 9.1 9.3 9.5 
2 Finland 9.4 2 8 0.07 9.8 9.1 9.3 9.5 
4 Sweden 9.3 4 9 0.08 9.7 8.9 9.2 9.4 
5 Singapore 9.2 5 12 0.13 9.5 8.1 8.9 9.4 
6 Norway 9.0 6 9 0.07 9.3 8.7 8.9 9.1 
7 Netherlands 8.9 7 9 0.11 9.3 8.1 8.7 9.1 
8 Australia 8.8 8 11 0.12 9.4 8.2 8.6 9.0 
8 Switzerland 8.8 8 8 0.22 9.4 7.5 8.4 9.1 
10 Canada 8.7 10 9 0.15 9.3 8.1 8.4 8.9 
11 Luxembourg 8.5 11 8 0.25 9.1 7.1 8.1 8.9 
12 Hong Kong 8.4 12 11 0.17 9.1 7.3 8.1 8.7 
13 Iceland 8.3 13 8 0.27 9.5 7.1 7.8 8.7 
14 Germany 8.0 14 10 0.18 9.1 7.1 7.8 8.4 
14 Japan 8.0 14 12 0.27 9.1 5.7 7.6 8.5 
16 Austria 7.8 16 10 0.24 8.9 6.7 7.4 8.2 
[Source: 27] 
The credibility problem could be overcome by only allowing the buying of carbon credits from 
selected countries, such as the highly ranked countries in Table 1.  However, the problems 
of losing government revenue and of dissipating CPRS’s role to promote renewable 
generation still exist. 
2.3 Mineral resource rent tax supplementing the CPRS 
This section discusses how the mineral resource rent tax (MRRT) is necessary to 
supplement the CPRS as the CPRS fails to address or causes the following two 
maladaptions to climate change. 
• Exporting fossil fuels 
• Exporting the additional fossil fuels that CPRS will make uneconomical to burn in 
Australia 
The CPRS will reduce the use of coal for electricity generation in Australia, which is effective 
for CO2 emissions reduction in Australia.  However this reduction in coal use means that 
more coal is available for export and unless every coal importing country has similar policy 
measures to Australia, then the Australian CPRS has only succeeded in switching the 
location of where the CO2 is emitted.  The switching problem is a maladaption to climate 
change and is an unintended consequence of the NEM’s adaption to climate change.  
In addition to the switching problem there is the increasing use of coal overseas.  For 
instance Bardsley [29] reports on China’s increase use of power and implementing 
renewable energy but there is also an overall increase in coal use.  The amount of coal 
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Australia burns compared to the amount exported is trivial, so the Australian CPRS in 
isolation is really just tokenism. 
Introducing the MRRT addresses the gap in the CPRS by helping coal importing countries 
moderate their use of coal and addressing the switching problem. The MRRT is a win for 
climate change but is also a win for Australia for the following five reasons. 
• Fossil fuels are finite. 
• The temporary resource boom causes capital destruction in other more long term 
industries. 
• MRRT is superior to resource royalties by maximising revenue from the economic 
rent. 
• MRRT may moderate the more destructive mineral exploration, so protect the 
Australian environment. 
• The revenue from the MRRT provides funds for a sovereign or future fund or capital 
development. 
Fossil fuels are a finite resource, which Shafiee and Topal [30] estimate depletion time of 35, 
107 and 37 years for oil, coal and gas respectively, so it is important for Australia to derive 
benefit by extracting the maximum economic rent from their sale over their short life.  
Shafiee and Topal’s [30] estimated depletion time for gas may have to be revised given the 
recent Coal Seam Gas (CSG) discoveries.  Additionally, many of the shareholders of 
resources companies are foreign, so the profits go overseas, which compounds the 
requirement to extract the maximum economic rent for Australia.  In particular, China’s 
managed exchange rate has enabled China to build up huge foreign reserves, which can be 
used to buy Australian resources companies, so China can obtain most of the economic rent.  
Australian Associated Press (AAP) [31] reports on China's 'resource imperialism' as a risk 
for Australia and that the state of China is not playing by the same short term gains of the 
capitalist society and it is naïve to assume everything is fine.  This sentiment is echoed in 
Burrell [32] who quotes the Premier of Western Australia after the sale of Premier Coal to 
China "From the state's point of view, the Premier Coal project is the major supplier of coal 
to the state-owned coal power stations, … That contract will continue, but we do have some 
concerns about security of supply and what this means for the long term.”  A MRRT would 
help conserve and maintain mineral resources as a strategic asset. 
The resources boom is causing a high and volatile exchange rate for Australia.  According to 
traditional economic theory, the economy adjusts to the high exchange rate by people 
switching employment from declining areas of the economy, such as tourism and 
manufacturing, into the mining sector.  However Keen [33] discusses this simple switching of 
employment or economic restructuring as a free trade fallacy because there is an associated 
cost of the capital destruction in manufacturing and tourism, as the capital loses value and 
falls into disrepair.  Furthermore Lamont [34] comments that the economic restructuring 
could possibly be justified if mining was a permanent way of life but resource booms bust 
and mineral resources are finite.  Lamont [34] recommends the MRRT as a way to moderate 
exchange rate fluctuations and ameliorate the capital destruction effect in the manufacturing 
and tourism sectors. 
An explanation of the prisoner’s dilemma as a model of cooperation and conflict is 
introduced because the dilemma captures the cooperation and conflict aspects of the MRRT 
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at both the interstate and international levels.  The classic dilemma centres around two 
isolated unconvicted prisoners guilty of the same crime but the police are unable to convict 
either prisoner.  If both prisoners remain silent, they both received relatively short sentences.  
If either prisoner confesses to convict the other prisoner, they walk free and the other 
prisoner receives a very long sentence.  If they both confess to convict one another, both 
receive a medium sentence.  Assuming a one off situation and that both prisoners behave 
selfishly, both prisoners confess to convict one another.  But if the situation is repeated and 
the prisoners can communicate, the outcome would favour cooperation.  The analogy 
between the prisoner’s dilemma and MRRT is that cooperation between governments leads 
to higher revenue and selfishness between governments leads to poorer revenues but there 
is always the incentive to cheat on any MRRT agreement. 
Henry [35] considers tax on the following four items the most robust and efficient taxes. 
• personal income 
• business income 
• private consumption 
• economic rent from land and resources – (MRRT) 
Henry [35] recommends that resource royalties be replaced by the MRRT.  In agreement, 
Verrender [36] discusses how the state based royalty system is antiquated and inefficient 
and how inconsistencies in state and federal taxation cause investment misallocation and 
where investors can play one state off against another undermining taxation efforts.  
Additionally, Taylor [37] discusses how the states undermine the federal governments tax 
revenue.  Replacing the state based royalties and federal tax on minerals with a MRRT, 
which the state and federal governments could share, would help maximise tax revenue 
from economic rent and avoid these prisoner’s dilemma scenarios.  However, Henry [35] 
concedes that the revenue from MRRT will be more volatile than from the existing resource 
royalties, which the MRRT will replace. 
The resource boom has generated exploration of gas from new sources such as coal seam 
gas.  For instance Roberts [38] reports on a claim from Santos that the only way to meet the 
surge in demand for gas are unconventional methods such as coal seam gas extraction.  But 
Klan [39] discusses how the process of extracting coal seam gas damages the aquifers and 
uses a carcinogenic mixture of benzene, toluene, ethyl-benzene and xylenes (BTEX) to aid 
the cracking of the aquifers to release the gas in a process, called fracking.  Darling [40], the 
Queensland Minster of the Environment, discusses the results of an investigation into the 
carcinogenic contaminants formaldehyde and thiocyanate found in aquifers near a Kingaroy 
site using the coal seam gas extracting chemical where the contaminates were most likely 
the results of agricultural practices, as such, there is some uncertainty over the possible 
contamination that may be caused by coal seam gas extraction.  A resource boom is short 
lived compared to the aquifers, which if left uncontaminated and managed could provide 
Australia with a permanent source of water and given the projected decreases in rainfall 
these aquifers become more important.  The MRRT would moderate this extreme form of 
exploration, so help to preserve the aquifers and coal seam gas until a less toxic and 
damaging technique is developed to remove the gas.  The Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation (ABC) [41] reports on moves by the Western Australian Government to 
introduce legislation to require public disclosure of environmental management reports for 
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fracking projects and the Queensland Minister of the Environment [42] announced a ban on 
BTEX, so there appears some adaption to moderate the potential harm from this process.   
Norway and Chile are mineral resource rich countries that have successfully implemented a 
MRRT to provide reserves of foreign exchange in a sovereign or future fund.  However, 
Hepworth [43] reports the second biggest mining company in the world called Vale is 
warning that new mining investments in Australia are at risk because of the CPRS and 
MRRT and alternative countries for investment will be sort.  This situation is another 
prisoner’s dilemma scenario where there is the potential for Australia to promote the MRRT 
internationally through an organisation of mineral exporting countries.  An international 
MRRT would help moderate bubbles, CO2 emissions and increase government revenues for 
mineral exporting countries. 
2.4 Renewable energy targets 
Table 2 shows the renewable energy targets (RET) that are the required GWh of renewable 
source electricity legislated by the Australian Government [44] in the Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) Act 2000. 
Table 2 Renewable energy target legislated by the Australian Government  
Required GWh of renewable source electricity 
Year GWh 
2011 10400 
2012 12300 
2013 14200 
2014 16100 
2015 18000 
2016 22600 
2017 27200 
2018 31800 
2019 36400 
2020 41000 
2030 41000 
[Source:  44] 
The objects of this Act are: 
(a) to encourage the additional generation of electricity from renewable sources; and 
(b) to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in the electricity sector; and 
(c) to ensure that renewable energy sources are ecologically sustainable. 
 
This is done through the issuing of certificates for the generation of electricity using eligible 
renewable energy sources and requiring certain purchasers (called liable entities) to 
surrender a specified number of certificates for the electricity that they acquire during a year. 
This section discusses each object of the RET legislation for sources of maladaption in an 
order that aids clarity of argument. 
Object (b) to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in the electricity sector  
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Garnaut [2] states that “No useful purpose is served by other policies that have as their 
rationale the reduction of emissions from sectors covered by the trading scheme [CPRS]. 
The Mandatory Renewable Energy Target should be phased out.”  In an ideal world the 
phase out of RET is totally warranted but there are at least four considerations that make the 
use of two policy instruments to address a single policy target necessary: 
• market failure; 
• corruption; 
• political lobbying; and 
• conflict of interest. 
The previous section discusses the market failure of EU ETS and that Garnaut [2] expects 
market failure in Australia’s response to carbon pricing due to structural problems.  The RET 
would provide a backup policy to achieve carbon emissions reductions when the Australian 
ETS fails.  Garnaut also proposes trading carbon emission abatements internationally.  
However, if Australia were importing carbon emission abatements from Europe right now, 
the failure of the European ETS would push down the price of imported carbon emission 
abatements, which would undermine Australian efforts to reduce carbon emissions and 
undermine support for developing electricity from renewable energy.  
Furthermore, the previous section also discusses the experience of the NZ ETS and the 
corruption in the UN-backed CER, which would have similar consequences for an Australian 
ETS as the European ETS market failure described above.  Again the RET provides a safety 
net for renewable energy generators and carbon emission abatement against ETS 
corruption or contagion from ETS market failure elsewhere. 
In addition, Foster et al. [6] discuss the conflict of interest between state ownership of coal 
generators and private companies or individuals introducing renewable energy generators, 
particularly onshore wind generation.  Parkinson [45] discusses Victorian legislation 
introduced to restrict new onshore wind generating capacity and block expansions of the 
interconnectors between South Australia (SA) and Victoria, which will prevent the flow of 
surplus electricity from SA’s wind generators to the rest of the NEM.  The RET provide 
protection for renewable generators against such politically induced maladaption. 
The coal industry as a political lobby group has fought a long battle with the government 
over the introduction of the CPRS and MRRT.  For instance Orr and Costar [46] discuss the 
Australian Electoral Commission’s slow disclosure of political lobbying and donations “More 
successful were the big miners… The Mining Council of Australia reported $4 million and the 
Association of Mining Export Companies $2.2 million. But this was just the tail-end of the 
anti-mining tax campaign, the bulk of which (over $22 million more in advertising) had been 
spent in the previous financial year and helped bring down Rudd’s prime ministership.”  This 
slow disclosure is a flaw in the electoral process that undermines the democratic process 
and is a source of maladaption to climate change.  Orr and Costar [46] call for a real time 
disclosure of political lobbying and donations via a publically accessible website among 
other measures to remedy the situation.  These measures would address this source of 
maladaption. 
There is no doubt that the coal lobby group will try to water down the CPRS once the ETS is 
introduced.  The mining industry has the wealth to instigate further national advertising 
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campaigns against the CPRS and MRRT.  The renewable energy sector is fragmented and 
small in comparison.  The RET protects the renewable energy sector in case the coal lobby 
is successful in undermining the CPRS. 
COAG [47] proposes a “review of the operation of the RET scheme will be undertaken in 
2014 to coincide with the review of the CPRS so that the review of RATE [RET-affected, 
trade-exposed] assistance can be conducted in parallel with the planned review of 
assistance for EITE [emissions-intensive, trade-exposed] industries.”  This COAG review of 
the RET and the CPRS is an area of policy uncertainty.  Intense pressure from the coal 
industry could see the CPRS watered down and the RET expire, which would hamper the 
development of renewable generation. 
Object (c) to ensure that renewable energy sources are ecologically sustainable 
The CPRS in isolation would fail to meet this object for two reasons, the import of cheap 
carbon emission abatement credits and the substitution of gas for coal as source of energy.  
Object (a) to encourage the additional generation of electricity from renewable 
sources  
This object uses the plural of source but so far the RET has reinforced the first mover 
advantage of onshore wind and solar PV generation.  There lacks a mechanism to develop a 
portfolio of generator technologies and energy sources to reduce risk of supply.  
For instance, Ball et al. [48] discuss how historically Australia’s ample supply of coal has 
underpinned its power system but competing countries have used a variety of different 
energy sources and, as a result of this diversity, many have a more resilient power system to 
provide future electrical power. 
However, given the policy uncertainty surrounding CPRS, the requirement for a broader 
portfolio of energy generation and the first mover advantage of onshore wind and small scale 
solar PV, a more selective RET that allocated targets to specific renewable energy 
generation and size would help reduce policy uncertainty and expand the portfolio of energy 
to better meet the original intent of the legislation ‘to encourage the additional generation of 
electricity from renewable sources’.  
For instance, a selective RET for solar thermal and large scale PV would help address the 
failure of the Solar Dawn Project and the Moree Solar Project to strike power purchase 
agreements, which are necessary pre-requisite to obtain finance from the banks [49].  A 
selective RET would require some coordination to ensure that the renewable energy 
generator could be commercial deployed. 
Rather than using the RET, Garnaut [2] suggests addressing the expected market failure in 
carbon pricing with policies on research, development and commercialisation of new 
technologies.  The Moree Solar and Solar Dawn Projects’ failure to achieve a power 
purchase agreement show that the current research, development and commercialization 
policies are insufficient without a more selective RET based on energy technology and size. 
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2.5 Smart Grids 
“A Smart Grid is an electricity network that can intelligently integrate the actions of all users 
connected to it - generators, consumers and those that do both – in order to efficiently 
deliver sustainable, economic and secure electricity supplies.”  [50] 
This section discusses smart grids to provide climate change adaption indicators for use in 
forthcoming report Foster et al. [5] to test a proposition regarding the institutional structure 
best suited to adapt to climate change.  Smart Grid [51] considers seven components 
comprise a smart grid. 
• The smart grid 
• The smart house 
• Renewable energy 
• Consumer engagement 
• Operations centres 
• Distributed intelligence 
• Plug-in vehicles  
There is a need for a number of climate change adaption indicators to measure all seven 
components.  Additionally, some of these components are dependent on another component, 
so a plan to manage the implementation of a smart grid is required.  For instance the Korea 
Smart Grid Institute [52] manages the Korean government’s smart grid road map shown in 
Table 3. 
Table 3 South Korea's Smart Grid Roadmap 
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[Source: 52] 
Korean Smart Grid Initiative (KSGI) [52] discusses a ‘test-bed’ funding of a total of 64.5 
billion won, which will be invested between 2009 and 2013 on Jeju Island in the first stage of 
the roadmap.  Jeju is located off the most southerly tip of Korea.  Jeju offers isolations from 
the mainland grid and offers high levels of solar radiation and wind speeds to test the 
integration of renewable energy.  Additionally, Jeju is a semi-autonomous region, so 
modifying legislation to accommodate smart grid technology is more readily achieved.  Jeju 
had a population of 531,887 in 2005 and area of 1,848 km2, so the test-bed is of significant 
dimensions.  The second stage of the roadmap is a rollout of smart grid technology to the 
mainland’s metropolitan areas and the third stage to the remainder of South Korea.  The 
monopoly ownership of both transmission and distribution by the Korean Electric Power 
Company (KEPCO) allows an easily coordinated deployment of smart grid technology.  
Korea is leading the world in an integrated approach to deployment of smart grid technology.  
Italy is the world leader in deployment of smart meters, where the former state owned 
monopoly utility called Ente Nazionale per l'Energia eLettrica [53] deployed 33 million smart 
meters over a five year period from 2001.   
However more recently the Australian Prime Minister et al. [54] announced a $100 million 
funding agreement for the ‘Smart Grid, Smart City’ program.  The Commonwealth Scientific 
and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) [55] discuss how ‘Smart Grid, Smart City’ 
“will deploy a live, integrated, commercial size smart grid in the Newcastle area, with parts of 
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the trial also conducted in Newington, Sydney's central business district (CBD), Ku-ring-gai 
and Scone, NSW”.  The results of this test bed will be available to other electricity 
companies to enable a piecemeal national rollout of smart grid technology.  Smart Grid 
Australia [56] discusses the importance of R&D conducted in parallel with these test 
installations to better inform the national rollout. 
The following section further discusses the relationship between monopoly ownership and 
climate change performance outcomes.  Smart Grid [51] and KSGI [52] in Table 3 provide a 
list of potential climate change adaption indicators, which the forthcoming report Foster et al. 
[5] further discusses.  
• Roadmap 
• Real time power grid monitoring 
• Digital power transmission 
• Smart meters and home management systems 
• Smart appliances 
• Consumer choice over dynamic pricing 
• Plug-in electric vehicles and infrastructure 
• Power storage 
• Renewable energy penetration and integration 
• Home power generation / Feed-in tariffs 
• Consumer engagement / time of use programs 
• Self-healing grid 
• Improve visualisation of grid and sharing of information 
2.6 Institutional complexity and the NEM grid as a natural monopoly  
Foster et al. [6] find institutional fragmentation induced maladaption to climate change 
particularly present in transmission and distribution.  The more detailed analysis in the 
previous sections finds that fragmentation induced maladaption is apparent in the feed-in 
tariff, CPRS and smart grid.  These three fragmentation maladaption sources contribute 
directly or indirectly to the fragmentation maladaption of the transmission and distribution 
networks. 
Regarding political fragmentation, REN21 [22] groups Australia, Canada and the US 
together as unique amongst other countries in their response to climate change being state 
or province based rather than national.  Foster et al. [6] also discusses state based 
ownership of transmission and distribution as a cause of fragmentation maladaption. This 
fragmentation induced maladaption becomes apparent when facing a major challenge such 
as adaption to climate change, which requires numerous simultaneous changes to the grid 
to accommodate renewables and smart grid technologies.  For instance the California 
Energy Commission [57] states “major regional transmission projects that involve multiple 
jurisdictions and utilities and are needed for integrating remote resources, reducing costs, 
improving market operations, providing long term strategic benefits and improving operating 
flexibility, don’t have a clear path forward.”  As, simultaneously coordinating changes across 
a grid, can affect all the owners in different ways, then meeting the vested interest of multiple 
owners quickly becomes an intractable problem.  Garnaut [2] describes transmission as a 
market failure requiring attention.  AEMC [14] proposes a single national co-ordinating 
transmission network service provider (TNSP) to manage the planning of all transmission 
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assets in the NEM and a NEM wide transmission business to manage locational marginal 
pricing for generators [14].  These two companies could partially address the fragmentation 
maladaption by transforming the NEM’s transmission into a pseudo monopoly.  However the 
proposal adds yet another two companies operating in NEM adding to the complexity.  
Garnaut [2] discuss the public good aspects of interconnectors. 
• Public goods—Infrastructure that is a pure public good (that is, non-rival and non-
excludable) may be underprovided because the infrastructure provider is unable to 
capture the full benefits of its investment. 
• Natural monopoly—Where infrastructure is best provided by a single firm, the firm 
may, without competition or regulation, underprovide and overcharge for use of the 
infrastructure 
The whole of the transmission and distribution in Korea is treated as a public good and forms 
a single natural monopoly called KEPCO, but KEPCO also owns most of the generation in 
Korea, which is not a natural monopoly.  As discussed, Korea’s response to climate change 
has been much faster than Australia, so the proposition that Australia’s slow response is 
caused by institutional fragmentation will be discussed further in Foster et al. [5]. 
The following comparison between the Korean and Australian transmission and distribution 
networks highlights the economic fragmentation within the NEM.  The Korean transmission 
system has a total transmission length of 30,676 km operated by KEPCO [58].  In 
comparison the NEM has a transmission length of just over 40,000 km operated by six 
transmission companies [59, 60].  In addition the NEM also has some privately owned 
interconnectors.  The Korean distribution system is operated by KEPCO [61] and serves 13 
million households.  In comparison the NEM has 13 distribution companies [59] and serves 8 
million end users [62]. 
 
Furthermore, Australia, Canada and the US have state or province base policy responses to 
climate change [22], which provides these counties with similar institutional fragmentation 
problems.  Table 7 compares the electricity consumption and production in kWh and GDP 
for Australia, Canada, US and South Korea.  GDP is given in purchasing power parity (PPP) 
equivalent US dollars. 
 
Table 4 International fragmentation comparison - raw data 
Raw           
data Australia Canada US South Korea 
Consumption 
(kWh) 225,400,000,000 549,500,000,000 3,741,000,000,000 402,000,000,000 
Production 
(kWh) 232,000,000,000 604,400,000,000 3,953,000,000,000 417,300,000,000 
GDP  
(PPP) 882,400,000,000 1,330,000,000,000 14,660,000,000,000 1,459,000,000,000 
States or 
Provinces 8 13 51 1 
[Source: 63] 
Table 8 is the power consumption and production and GDP in Table 7 divided by the number 
of political entities in the country that is state, province or territory 
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Table 5 International fragmentation comparison per political entity 
Per political 
entity Australia Canada US South Korea 
Consumption 
(kWh) 28,175,000,000 42,269,230,769 73,352,941,176 402,000,000,000 
Production 
(kWh) 29,000,000,000 46,492,307,692 77,509,803,922 417,300,000,000 
GDP         
(PPP) 110,300,000,000 102,307,692,308 287,450,980,392 1,459,000,000,000 
 
Table 8 shows that Australia has the smallest amount of power administered by a political 
entity, which means even in comparison with the other fragmented countries, Australia has 
more political overhead per unit of power consumed or produced.  As for GDP per political 
entity, Australia and Canada appear comparable in that each political entity administers 
about one third the GDP per political entity in the US.  This high political overhead per unit of 
power and low GDP per political entity corresponds with the slow response to climate 
change for each political entity in Australia.  Australia is the most fragmented of the 
fragmented group of three countries, where there is duplication of effort over relatively little 
power with relatively few resources. 
 
The fragmentation or coordination and planning problems in NEM are recognised by the 
MCE and by the establishment of the AEMO and AEMC and the numerous reports 
addressing coordination problems.  However, the AEMC [64] role is “to be the rule maker for 
national energy markets … [AEMC’s] key responsibilities are to consider rule change 
proposals, conduct energy market reviews and provide policy advice”  AEMC [65] comments 
on their terms of reference “MCE does not anticipate that this review will result in 
fundamental revision of market design …”. So, recommending a rationalisation and 
amalgamation of the ownership of transmission and distribution would be beyond the scope 
of the AEMC’s brief.  Hence, there appears no obvious mechanism in Australia to achieve 
the rationalisation that has occurred in South Korea to transmission and distribution, which 
was the product of the Japanese occupation followed by a series of military dictatorships.  In 
contrast each state within Australia in isolation developed transmission and distribution 
systems, which were natural monopolies.  However these once independent systems are 
now linked producing one natural monopoly with multiple owners.  In agreement, Stevens [7] 
recognises that there are strategic national planning problems to meet climate change due to 
the diverse ownership, particularly in the electricity sector, which may require government 
intervention to achieve desired outcomes.  For instance, South East Queensland (SEQ) 
Water [66] and SEQ Water Grid [67] provide an example of government intervention 
promoting rationalisation following the linking of once independent natural monopolies.  
Following the water reforms, the Queensland Minister for Energy and Water [68] discusses 
the approval of a new Workforce Framework to protect the rights of staff being moved 
between councils and SEQ distributor-retailers.   The framework’s principles reassured 
workers that labour savings was not the driver for the SEQ water reforms.  The framework 
protects the rights of workers for three years.  This sort of measure is an important 
consideration when the word rationalisation is mentioned as people fear the loss of their jobs.  
This fear would be a source of maladaption to climate change pending any rationalisation.  
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In addition the Australian National Broadband Network (NBN) [69] provides an example of a 
government lead initiative of a natural monopoly to transform Australia’s copper 
telecommunications network into fibre optics.  This transformation would become far more 
logistically challenging if the telecommunications network had a similar fragmented 
ownership pattern to the NEM.  The NEM will undergo similar transformations with the 
introduction of smart grid technologies, such as real-time measurement and smart metering 
where both projects would benefit from monopoly purchasing power and reduced 
coordination costs.  Both these technologies can defer investment in transmission and 
distribution.  Smart Grid Australia [56] suggests that the NBN also provides the means to 
deliver aspects of smart grid technology. 
The use of distributed generation within a smart grid can defer investment in transmission 
and distribution.  To accommodate distributed generation, the NEM is undergoing a 
transformation from the traditional unidirectional generator-transmission-distribution-
consumer model to a distributed and bidirectional model, where a combined transmission 
and distribution monopoly is better placed to coordinate the transformation.  For instance the 
Korean Smart Grid Institute [52] discusses Korea’s smart grid road map with near 
completion of the test bed in Jeju Island and with an expected national role out starting in 
2012 for completion in 2030.  KEPCO’s monopoly transmission and distribution is well suited 
to accommodate this transformation.  
In a further source of maladaption, Garnaut [2] discusses how the revenue of a distribution 
businesses is calculated on the value of the asset base, which creates the incentive to build 
more distribution infrastructure.  So, promoting distributed energy is in direct conflict with this 
arrangement.  In agreement, Hepworth [70] reports on an Energy Users Association of 
Australia [59, 71] report, which claims a systematic bias towards inflated forecasts of the 
capital and operating spending when their tariffs were set.  Furthermore, Hepworth [70] 
reports that the most costly increase in consumer electricity bills are in transmission and 
fossil fuel costs.  Hepworth [70] reports the Chairman of the Australian Energy Regulator 
(AER) Andrew Reeve saying how the rules governing the charging for electricity networks 
had to change. 
Regarding an impediment to the NEM adapting to climate change, the traditional role of 
mergers and acquisitions to enforce capital discipline and rationalise the market is lacking in 
the NEM’s transmission and distribution as the majority of transmission and distribution is 
held by state owned companies.  In contrast, David [72] discusses acquisition of privately 
owned transmission companies in the Philippines.  The National Grid Corporation of the 
Philippines (NGCP) has petitioned the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) to buy the 
transmission assets of the Cebu Energy Development Corporation (CEDC) for provisional 
approval authorising NGCP to acquire the assets of CEDC.  However, state ownership in 
Australia acts as an impediment to this form of rationalisation, so rationalisation would 
require political inspiration. 
In another conflict of interest to the introduction of distributed generation for the deferment of 
transmission investment is the state ownership of the coal generators where attaching 
distributed energy to the grid only provides competition for the coal generators.  For instance 
Parkinson [45] notes that legislative moves in Victoria to block further wind generation and 
an interconnector expansion between SA and VIC are such sources of maladaptation. 
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Under the current framework, the AEMC [65] discusses the lack of appropriate mechanism 
to address the addition of cluster of generators in geographic remote locations where these 
clusters are primarily onshore wind generation encouraged by the RET.  Garnaut [2] also 
discusses the cluster problem and associated free rider problem.  Adopting a monopoly 
transmission and distribution company would fail to completely solve this cluster problem but 
does significantly reduce the complexity of the problem. 
AEMC [65] expects that the expanded RET and to a lesser extent the CPRS will 
fundamentally change the utilisation of the network over time both between regions and 
within regions.  These expanded changes to flows are likely to put pressure on the existing 
framework governing transmission and distribution [65].  So, AEMC recommends a local 
price signal for generators adjusted for congestion, as the locational price signal will lead to 
more efficient decisions.  The AEMC [14] proposal for a single national co-ordinating TNSP 
to manage transmission planning and a NEM wide transmission business to manage 
locational marginal pricing for generators [14] is as close as the AEMC could come to 
recommending monopoly ownership of transmission within the terms of reference of the 
AEMC. 
2.7 Privatisation induced maladaption and alternatives 
This section discusses the Australian Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism’s [73] 
white paper calling on the privatisation of state owned energy companies.  The privatisation 
of state owned enterprises has potential for maladaption to climate change in the following 
ways: 
• importing culturally insensitive CEOs to cover the perceived shortage of Australian 
CEOs to manage the newly privatised energy companies; 
• the change in focus from the three-year election cycle to a quarterly business 
reporting cycle;   
• the failure to address fragmentation of a natural monopoly; 
• being offered one policy option when there are alternatives to the simple false 
dichotomy of either state ownership or private ownership; 
• selling assets at the tail end of the global financial crisis is poor timing; 
• privatised coal generators requiring subsidies to shutdown; 
• increasing the complexity of smart meter deployment; and 
• confusing retail customer churning for market efficiency. 
The culturally insensitivity of non-Australian CEOs controlling large natural monopolies is a 
potential source of maladaption for the NEM.  For instance Oakes [74] interviews the new 
CEO of Telstra, Thodey, about the previous US imported CEO Trujillo.  During Trujillo’s 
tenure about $25 billion was wiped from Telstra’s market value and customer complaints 
increased by 300%.  News [75] reports the then Prime Minister Howard complaining about 
Trujilo’s 30% pay increase of $11 million being an abuse of the capitalist system.  Natural 
monopolies are vulnerable to such abuse and there is little need for restraint for Trujillo with 
no long term vested interest in Australia’s well being.  Additionally, Trujillo was constantly in 
conflict with the political leaders of Australia over a wide range of issues.  In contrast the 
current Australian CEO’s of the NBN and Telstra, Quigley and Thodey just quietly and 
diplomatically go about their business.  Telstra was Australia’s national monopoly 
telecommunications provider. 
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The change from state ownership with a 3 year election cycle to the free market with 
quarterly reporting periods promotes short-termism in the energy sector where assets have a 
life of 40 years or more.  The White Paper also claims that private companies are more 
innovative as a reason for privatisation.  The inventiveness and short-termism of the free 
market is exemplified by Enron who invented numerous techniques to improve quarterly 
results.  Enron was audited by Arthur Anderson who provided Enron with a clean bill of 
health shortly before Enron’s bankruptcy.  Given Australia’s relative lack of corruption shown 
in Table 1 and lack of experience in dealing with people from such a business culture, there 
is cause to seriously doubt a role for foreign citizens managing Australia’s energy assets or a 
requirement for a raft of audit legislation to contain inappropriate behaviour. 
Additionally, the transfer of ownership from state to private sector fails to address the issue 
of fragmentation in the NEM, in particular the natural monopoly that is the NEM grid.  
However, there is the remote possibility of mergers and acquisitions resulting in a single 
holding company for transmission and distribution but this rationalisation process would be 
very torturous and wasteful.  For instance following Telstra’s privatisation and leadership by 
Trujillo, the retail and network arms of Telstra are being separated to form the NBN and 
Telstra retail.  This experiment in privatisation of a combined network and a retail business 
provides a tortured and wasteful route to rationalisation of the network as a natural monopoly 
under government control and the retail business in the private sector. 
Furthermore, the White Paper also offers a false dichotomy of either private ownership or 
state ownership.  Banks [76] calls for policy based on evidence and for policy advice to offer 
alternatives to help prevent ideology informing policy.  There are alternatives to this 
dichotomy.  For instance KEPCO is 51% owned by the South Korean government and the 
reminder in private hands.  This split ownership allows KEPCO to more readily raise capital, 
which is one of the reasons suggested for privatisation.  KEPCO is a world leader in 
innovation and reliability, so the White Paper’s innovation argument for 100% privatisation is 
weak.  Another alternative is state and federal governments maintain 51% joint ownership of 
a company that owns all transmission and distribution in the NEM to address fragmentation 
and fully privatise all generation and retail assets to address conflict of interest issues.  
There are alternatives to total privatisation that would better address fragmentation and 
conflict of interest and would be less susceptible to free market failures like Enron.  Foster et 
al. [6] discusses a research question to test the adaption performance of alternative 
economic structures to climate change. 
Selling assets at the tail end of the global financial crisis (GFC) is poor timing for two 
reasons: 
• the credit contraction reducing the saleable value of the assets; and 
• the uncertain economic conditions warranting a discount on the value of the assets. 
This uncertainty discount or risk premium induced by the GFC is compounded by the 
forthcoming introduction of the ETS.  This credit contraction and risk premium could be 
avoided by selling the assets after the global recovery from the GFC and after the ETS 
establishes some stability. 
However, the following issue remains for privatised coal generators.  Namely, members of 
the ageing fleet of coal generators will eventually become uneconomic to run once the ETS 
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comes into effect when the federal government will come under pressure to offer 
compensation, as is currently the case with the brown coal generators in Victoria.  This 
scenario undermines posited gains from privatising the coal generators.  Other than reducing 
conflict of interest to grid access, the gains from privatisation are marginal because the NEM 
trades via a gross pool market, so coal generators are already subject to an essential feature 
of market discipline.  Government compensation to privatised coal generators to shutdown 
due to the CPRS remains a vex issue. 
Furthermore, the introduction of in-house-display equipped smart meters and of dynamic 
pricing will have a large impact on ameliorating peak demand.  The issue over whether retail 
is privatised detracts from the national roll out of smart meters and the introduction of 
dynamic pricing.  The privatisation of retail and customer churning makes a systematic roll 
out of smart meters more challenging as the benefits from smart meters are spread amongst 
four stakeholders: the customer, retailer, distribution operator and transmission operator 
(WEC 2010).  Due to customer churning, the retailers are unable to guarantee returns from 
the smart meter installations, so installation is usually organised by the distribution operator.  
However, the stakeholder organising the roll out will determine a suite of smart meter 
features that benefits itself, leaving out desirable features that benefit the other stakeholders.  
For instance the roll out of smart meters in Victoria was organised by the distribution 
operators where the feedback advantages of the smart meters was promulgated to the 
public to smooth the way for the installations but the in-house-displays became an optional 
extra to be purchased by the customer.  This lack of clarity caused an adverse customer 
reaction who felt misguided by the distributors.  There is a requirement for careful evaluation 
of smart meter features to ensure that all stakeholders benefit from installation. 
Additionally, there is confusion in the literature between retail customer churning and market 
efficiency.  Any relationship between churning and market efficiency will be modest unless 
the customer has all the available pricing options presented in an unbiased way that can be 
readily compared.  Hence the retail market requires design to ameliorate information 
asymmetry to harness the full benefit for the customer.  A website comparing all the retail 
pricing options and the ability to swap retail provider on the website would go some way to 
meeting these requirements.  Additionally, an opt-in rather than an opt-out clause for door-
to-door sales would reduce biased presentations and reduce unnecessary churning.  
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 further discuss privatisation of retail and generation and the 
introduction of smart meters and dynamic pricing, respectively. 
3 Discussion 
This section proposes solutions to the climate change adaption issues found in the previous 
sections.  Foster et al. [6] develops research questions to test the proposed solutions.  The 
four main issues found hindering climate change adaption are:  
1. institutional fragmentation both economically and politically; 
2. distorted transmission and distribution investment deferment mechanisms; 
3. lacking mechanisms to develop a diversified energy portfolio; and 
The solutions to the issues are interdependent but the issues are discussed in turn for clarity 
of exposition and for ease of relation to the research questions.  Detailed justification for the 
solutions is already provided in the previous sections. 
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3.1 Institutional fragmentation both economically and politically 
The NEM is extremely fragmented both economically and politically, which continues to 
hinder the NEM’s adaption to climate change.  To address political fragmentation, the states 
of the NEM cede legislative power to the federal government over matters pertaining to the 
NEM.  To address economic fragmentation, the proposed solution is to transfer the 
ownership of all transmission and distribution in the NEM into a single holding company 
owned by the states, federal government and privately.  This produces alignment between 
single company ownership and the NEM’s transmission and distribution as a natural 
monopoly.  The governments maintain a controlling minimum stake of 51 % in the monopoly.  
To address conflict of interest between government and private entities on connections to 
the NEM grid, the government privatises all generation.  Similarly to address conflict of 
interest over retail, the government privatises all retail.  Section 2.7 discusses caveats to 
privatisation of generation and retail.  Foster et al. [6] develops research question to test the 
proposed economic and political structure as a solution to the NEM’s slow adaption to 
climate change. 
3.2 Distorted transmission and distribution investment deferment 
mechanisms 
The accelerated deterioration of the transmission and distribution due to climate change 
makes the deferment of investment more pressing.  Mechanisms for deferment include 
energy efficiency, smart meters, and modified feed-in tariffs. 
Other than for Minimum Energy Performance Standards (MEPS) and the star ratings, energy 
efficiency in the NEM is uncoordinated and lacks a national scheme [6].  The solution in the 
previous subsection addresses the lack of coordination and of a national scheme.  
Furthermore, people make myopic investment decisions by expecting shorter payback 
period than is economically optimal, which hinders the deployment of energy efficiency 
equipment.  Section 2.1 discusses in detail the solution of interest free loans to address this 
market failure.  The loans will also address equity concerns. 
The NEM with a single monopoly transmission and distribution company within a single 
legislative area as proposed in the previous section would aid a NEM wide role out of smart 
meters, providing monopoly buying powers and reducing coordination costs.  A NEM wide 
rollout of smart meters is trivial compared to Italy’s national rollout of smart meters.  
Following the NEM wide rollout of smart meters, deregulation of retail pricing will enable a 
price signal for peak demand period to moderate demand during peak period and so defer 
investment in transmission.  Smart meters and deregulated retail prices have positively 
engaged customers in other countries and have considerably reduced peak demand. 
In this project a prosumer is an entity that produces and consumes the same item.  For 
example the term prosumer is particularly useful to describe a household with solar PV that 
produces and consumes electricity. 
Section 2.1 discusses the requirement for a gross feed-in tariff based on the locational 
marginal price for prosumers to maximise generation capacity but prosumers still try to 
conserve electricity because prosumers will pay the normal tariff for electricity consumed.  
To aid transmission and distribution investment deferment, the prosumer only pays the 
transmission and distribution costs for electric supplied from the grid, which provides an 
extra incentive for the prosumer to install generation via a price signal.  This price signal to 
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install more generation is higher where the transmission and distribution cost are higher.  
Additionally, for the suggested gross feed-in to be effective, any solar bonus should be 
removed as the solar bonus causes cross subsidies generally from poorer households to 
richer households. 
Embedded generation such as solar PV requires a substantial capital investment with a long 
payback period.  As discussed in Section 2.1 under such circumstances people make 
myopic investment decisions.  Interest free loans are justified to address the market failure of 
myopic investment decisions, to address equity concerns and to capture the positive 
externalities, such as transmission investment determent. 
The research questions in Foster et al. [6] investigate the investment deferment potential of 
storage, pumped hydro storage and solar PV. 
3.3 Lacking mechanisms to develop a diversified energy portfolio 
A portfolio of energy is required to reduce supply risk.  The NEM’s current coal generation 
would gradually switch to gas generation under a functional CPRS, doing little to broaden 
the portfolio of energy.  The RET ensures a mix between fossil fuels and renewable energy 
but the current RET has exacerbated the first mover advantage of onshore wind and solar 
PV to the detriment of a wider portfolio of energy sources and technologies.  A modified RET 
that allocates targets to alternative technologies and energy sources would help develop a 
wider portfolio of energy sources with different energy profiles to solar PV and onshore wind.  
An adjunct or alternative approach is the feed-in tariff reverse auction planned by the ACT 
Minister for the Environment and Sustainable Development [21] for two large scale solar PV 
plants discussed in Section 2.1. 
The research questions in Foster et al. [6] investigate the various energy portfolios of solar 
PV and onshore wind to find an optimal mix to aid deferred investment in transmission and 
distribution.  NEMlink is also investigated for the better integration of onshore wind into the 
NEM.  The proposed NEMLink project includes two interconnectors between Tasmania and 
South Australia and between South Australia and Queensland.  NEMLink would require a 
major investment in transmission, so compromise is required between the objectives of 
investment deferment and of broadening the energy portfolio.  This compromise is 
particularly relevant to high concentrations of onshore wind. 
4 Conclusion 
The literature review in Section 2 finds three factors contributing to the NEM’s maladaption 
to climate change: 
1. institutional fragmentation both economically and politically; 
2. distorted transmission and distribution investment deferment mechanisms; and 
3. lacking mechanisms to develop a diversified energy portfolio. 
Section 3 provides a set of solutions to these factors of maladaption and Foster et al. [6] 
discusses research questions to test these solutions.  Forthcoming reports will address 
these research questions: 
• analysing the impacts of climate change on electricity demand [77]; 
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• analysing the impacts of climate change on electricity generation capacity and 
transmission networks [78]; and 
• assessing the current institutional arrangements for the development of electricity 
infrastructure to inform more flexible arrangements for effective adaptation [5]. 
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